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IS THE CRITICAL TRUST APPROACH TO 
RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE INCOMPATIBLE 
WITH RELIGIOUS PARTICULARISM? 
A REPLY TO MICHAEL MARTIN AND JOHN HICK 
Kai-man Kwan 
In contemporary philosophy of religion, many philosophers, e.g., William 
Alston, argue that we should treat religious experiences as prima facie reli-
able unless we have reasons to doubt them. I call this a Critical Trust 
Approach to religious experience. John Hick and Michael Martin have 
argued that this approach is incompatible with a particularist solution to 
the problem of religious pluralism. I argue that this is a misunderstanding 
of the Critical Trust Approach. I further explore how a religious particular-
ist who accepts this approach can deal with conflicts between presumptive 
data, and argue that the particularist approach to religious experience is not 
necessarily inferior to atheistic and pluralist approaches. 
The Tension between the Critical Trust Approach and Religious Diversity 
In recent years, there is a revival of the argument from religious experience 
among analytic philosophers of religion. John Hick was one of its early 
defenders. Richard Swinburne gave it epistemological sophistication by 
propounding and defending the Principle of Credulity which says that if it 
seems (epistemically) to one that x is present, then probably x is present 
unless there are special considerations to the contrary.' While William 
Alston does not agree with Swinburne on many (minor) points, his 
Doxastic Practice Approach to religious experience is structurally similar to 
Swinburne's. His Perceiving God is an impressive work which elaborates 
and defends this approach by arguing that it is practically rational to 
regard all socially established doxastic practices as prima facie reliable.2 I 
will call this kind of approach the Critical Trust Approach (CTA). The 
Principle of Credulity is renamed The Principle of Critical Trust (PCT). The 
name highlights two major and interdependent components of this episte-
mology: 1) initial trust of our experiences; 2) critical examination of those 
experiences to see whether they are subject to defeaters. (The latter compo-
nent is worth emphasizing because many tend to associate Swinburne's 
Principle of Credulity or Alston's Doxastic Practice Approach with uncriti-
cal blind trusty According to John Hick, "Many of us today who work in 
the philosophy of religion are in broad agreement with William Alston that 
the most viable defense of religious belief has to be a defense of the ratio-
nality of basing belief (with many qualifying provisos which Alston has 
carefully set forth) on religious experience."4 
The most serious problem that the CTA faces is religious diversity. Four 
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major approaches to account for the variety of religions and religious expe-
riences are: 
1) Religious Exclusivism/Particularism: only one world religionS is cor-
rect, and all others are mistaken. I prefer the name "particularism" 
here because the word "exclusivism" has negative connotations. 
Furthermore, exclusivism is often defined by Hick and others primar-
ily in terms of salvation: "exclusivism asserts that salvation is con-
fined to Christians."b It needs to be emphasized that religious particu-
larism or exclusivism, as defined here, does not entail the above 
view. It is even compatible with the most inclusive interpretation of 
salvation, universalism, e.g., a particular interpretation of 
Barthianism. 
2) Religious Inclusivism: only one world religion is fully correct, but 
other world religions participate in or partially reveal some of the 
truth of the one correct religion. 
3) Religious Pluralism: ultimately all world religions are equally cor-
rect, each offering a different, salvific path and partial perspective vis-
a-vis the one Ultimate Reality.7 
4) Atheism: all religions are mistaken; there is no God and no tran-
scendent realm. 
What are the theological implications of the CTA, if any? Does it lead to 
some particular theological positions, e.g., pluralism? Is it compatible with, 
say, Exclusivism?- this is an urgent question because in endorsing the 
PCT, initially all religious experiences have to be accorded equal weight. 
Isn't it then difficult to maintain that only one world religion is correct? As 
Hick points out, the challenge is that "the same epistemological principle 
establishes the rationality of Jews, Muslims, Hindus, Buddhists, etc in 
holding beliefs that are at least partly, and sometimes quite radically, 
incompatible with the Christian belief-system. Belief in the reality of Allah, 
Vishnu, Shiva, and of the non-personal Brahman, Dharrnakaya, Tao seem 
to be as experientially well based as belief in the reality of the Holy 
Trinity."s 
Of course Alston has been keenly aware of this problem but he main-
tains two things: 1) although the problem of religious diversity will reduce 
the rationality of participating in the Christian Doxastic Practice, it does not 
destroy it altogether; 2) the solution of this problem does not necessarily 
lead to a pluralist hypothesis like Hick's theory; his approach is compatible 
with the rationality of a religious particularist position.9 In a Festschrift for 
Alston, several philosophers also advocate a particularist position. lO In the 
July 1997 issue of Faith and Philosophy, Hick attacks these "conservative 
Christian philosophers" and a spirited debate between Hick, on the one 
side and Alston, Mavrodes, van Inwagen, Plantinga, and K. J. Clark, on the 
other, ensued. Hick's main purpose is to show that "we do not yet have 
any adequate response from conservative Christian philosophers to the 
problem of religious diversity."" 
A main argument of his is that Alston's experience-based apologetics for 
religion is incompatible with his exclusivism: "For if only one of the many 
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belief-systems based upon religious experience can be true, it follows that 
religious experience generally produces false beliefs, and that it is thus a generally 
unreliable basis for belief-formation": this is then" a reversal of the principle, 
for which Alston has argued so persuasively, that religious experience con-
stitutes as legitimate a ground for belief-formation as does sense experi-
ence."12 In other words, Hick thinks that the combination of CT A and reli-
gious exclusivism is self-undermining. This is also a very common objection 
raised against the argument from religious experience by atheists. For 
example, Michael Martin asserts that the deliverances of religious experi-
ences are so contradictory that as a whole they are shown to be unreliable. 
As a result, the Principle of Critical Trust shouldn't be applied to religious 
experiencesY While both Martin and Hick concur with the incompatibility 
of the CT A and religious exclusivism, and thus the untenability of the first 
approach, they draw different conclusionsY Martin does not seriously con-
sider the pluralist hypothesis, and thinks that the conflict between religious 
experiences tends to support the fourth approach, atheism. Hick maintains 
that a religious interpretation of reality is still possible in the face of the con-
flict between religious experiences. However, only his religious pluralism 
(the third approach) can save the day for those who do not accept atheism. 
Hick also has other reasons for thinking that the CT A should lead to 
religious pluralism rather than particularism, e.g., the latter is arbitrary and 
unable to explain the roughly equal soteriological efficacy of the world reli-
gions. In this essay, however, I will concentrate only on the alleged incom-
patibility between the CTA and religious exclusivism15 which is regarded 
by D. Z. Phillips as a devastating criticism of Alston.16 I argue instead that it 
is the result of a misunderstanding of the CTA. Alston has already briefly 
indicated this misunderstanding: "even if most beliefs based on religious 
experience were false, that would not contradict the epistemological claims 
I make for religious experience" which is that "its seeming to one that 
some Ultimate Reality (UR) is presenting itself to one's experience as phi 
makes it prima facie justified that UR is phi."17 However, in view of its per-
sistence, this objection deserves a fuller treatment. I argue below that the 
CT A is indeed compatible with particularism, and also that it is more consis-
tent with particularism than with Hick's pluralism. 
Applicability of the Principle of Critical Trust to Conflicting Experiences 
The first question we should settle is whether the existing contradictions 
between religious experiences make the PCT inapplicable to them. It is a 
totally different one from the question: "if we grant some evidential force to 
religious experiences, will such conflicts cancel this force?" Let us first distin-
guish the PCT from the following Probable Inference Rule (PIR): 
PIR If it seems to me that x is F, then probably x is F in the sense that 
it is more often than not the case that x is F. 
A type of experience has type-reliability if more than half of its tokens are 
veridical. The applicability of the PIR to a type of experience is tied to its 
type-reliability. If it can be shown to be type-unreliable, then the PIR can 
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hardly be applied to it. In the case when the tokens of that type grossly 
conflict with one another, the type-reliability would be greatly in doubt 
and hence the PIR is not applicable. So the presence of massive contradic-
tions do debar us from applying the PIR. However, the applicability of the 
PCT is not thereby endangered. To apply the PCT to some experiences is to 
have initial trust in them and, if they are defeated, to salvage as much as 
possible from them. The PCT does not entail the PIR. There is no contradic-
tion in saying that we should have initial trust in conflicting experiences. 
There is no contradiction even between legitimately having initial trust in a 
type of experience and the fact that most tokens of that type turn out to be 
unveridical! Since the PCT is often compared to the presumption of inno-
cence in law, let us consider the following legal analogy. Suppose in a cer-
tain democratic country both the common people and the legal authority 
are very cautious in prosecuting others. They will not do so unless over-
whelming evidence is available. So it turns out that 99% of the suspects 
were convicted and not even one such verdict was found to be wrong. On 
the other hand, the legal procedure adheres strictly to the presumption of 
innocence as well. That the above scenario is obviously possible shows that 
there is no contradiction between these two statements: 1) each and every 
suspect was legitimately presumed to be innocent in the beginning; 2) the 
overwhelming majority of the suspects were in fact not innocent. Let me 
further illustrate this with the Parable of the Survivors. 
Suppose a nuclear holocaust occurs and the survivors are badly hurt by 
radiation. Mutations occur such that during their seeing the proximal stim-
uli produced by external objects are always blended with internally gener-
ated noise. The result is that the apparent size, shape and color of a nearby 
object can vary for different individuals and can also vary from time to 
time for the same individual. The saving grace is that the noise level does 
not exceed the threshold which would destroy altogether the capability of 
object recognition. So the people can still, with difficulty, know that some 
object is around. The result is a kind of "vision" which can roughly locate a 
medium size object nearby but everything else is blurred and unstable. 
Notice that the erroneous perceptions are always integrated with the 
roughly correct identifications. Phenomenologically speaking, we can't 
separate these two kinds of perceptions: the bare recognition of object ver-
sus the more detailed perception of color, shape and size. In this case 
should those people accord some evidential force to their perceptions? 
Suppose they don't and instead they adopt initial scepticism towards their 
"perceptions." Namely, they insist that their perceptions have to be treated 
as "guilty until proven innocent." Can they demonstrate the reliability of 
their 'perceptions' by another means? Hardly! What about the availability 
of tests? There may not be effective tests which have consistent results. 
Scepticism results and would rob the people of the only information they 
still possess! This consequence seems to be counter-intuitive. Instead it is 
plausible to say the PCT is applicable here. By applying it, the survivors 
will come to trust their ability to locate medium size objects while not giv-
ing undue confidence to their color and shape perceptions. The PCT is 
"charitable" enough here without being unduly uncritical. The idea here is 
that although the "perceptions," described at the highest level of descrip-
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tion, are grossly inconsistent, they do convey information about the reality 
at a lower level of description. Indeed the parable is suggestive. It shows 
that it is quite conceivable that even though religious experiences as a 
whole are not entirely accurate, they can be reasonably informative at a 
lower level of description. There is no a priori reason for believing that con-
tradictions of experiences would entail their total unreliability. 
Furthermore, almost all sorts of experience or doxastic practices pro-
duce conflicting beliefs sooner or later. Empirically speaking no experience 
which we commonly regard as reliable is completely free from this prob-
lem. Oust think of the empiricists' "argument from illusion.") So why do 
we think that the presence of contradictions in religious experience should 
debar us from having initial trust, at least to a small degree, in religious 
experience? We must have set a threshold amount of contradictions such 
that if any epistemic practice produces an amount of contradictions 
beyond this threshold, it will be subject to initial scepticism. In other 
words, there is a minimum degree of consistency before a kind of experi-
ence can be treated as prima facie reliable. Unfortunately, it is not clear 
how this absolute threshold can be determined. (It is not clear how degree 
of contradictions can be precisely measured.) To draw the line with senso-
ry experience alone on the clean side and the rest on the dirty side seems 
arbitrary and unduly restrictive. On the other hand, suppose we take into 
consideration various experiences and epistemic practices which do pro-
duce contradictory judgments to different degrees, e.g., memory, intro-
spection, moral experience, aesthetic experience, logical intuitions, histori-
cal investigation, philosophy, literary criticism, "revolutionary science" (in 
Kuhn's sense). It then seems implausible to assert any absolute threshold 
of tolerable contradictions. We have yet to see a good argument for not 
granting some defeasible evidential force to religious experiences sheerly 
because of their alleged contradictions. 
However the degree of contradictions in a type of experience does have 
epistemic relevance: it serves as a possible defeater of the prima facie justi-
fication of experiences. If a kind of experience has absolutely no stability 
and recognizable consistency, surely we can discount it. Here John Baillie's 
comments seem to be judicious. He admits that, in discussing moral judg-
ments, "if there were no degree of consensus as to what is right and what is 
wrong, we might well come to feel that our moral judgments were no 
more than individual seeming."18 However he contends that "when we 
pass to the higher regions of our experience, to what we have called our 
subtler and more delicate awareness, we do not expect universal agree-
ment." The middle way he adopts is that "some considerable measure of agree-
ment, though it is still not a 'test of truth,' is normally a necessary condition 
of the security of individual judgement."19 
Dealing with Conflicts: Critical Trust versus Absolute Scepticism 
If the above argument is correct, then the PCT is applicable to conflicting 
religious experiences, and there is no logical incompatibility between the 
CTA and religious particularism. However, the atheists may still insist that 
religious particularism is still incongruent or incoherent (in a broad sense) 
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with the PCT. Unless the particularists can offer a plausible explanation of 
how the two go together, they maintain, the atheistic approach seems 
superior. The following is a response to this possible query. 
First of all, it is important to note that the PCT does not license the irra-
tionality of swallowing a grossly inconsistent set of beliefs. To have initial 
trust in contradictory experiences does not commit one to accepting all of 
them. On the contrary, this is only the first step to ensure a proper initial 
base on which we can then exercise our critical faculty rigorously. When 
conflicts between our presumptive data occur, there is a need for critical 
sifting. (That is why this approach is called the Critical Trust Approach.) 
However, in line with the spirit of the PCT, we should choose the consis-
tent subset of the presumptive data which has maximum weight. 
Moreover, even when a token experience is defeated, we should strive to 
preserve the elements of truth in it. Before exploring this process of critical 
sifting in more details, in this section I want to defend the rationality of the 
above way of dealing with conflicting experiences vis-a.-vis the atheists' 
alternative, which seems to presuppose the Sceptical Rule (SR): 
SR When experiences or claims conflict with one another, we 
should reject all of them. 
Should we adopt the SR instead? I don't think so. Consider the conflict of 
eye-witnesses' accounts of a certain event. It would indeed be irrational to 
reject all their accounts just because they conflict! (Contrarily it's ironical 
that perfect match between independent witnesses may sometimes induce 
suspicion.) It seems to be a rational strategy to try to reconcile their reports 
as much as possible. For example, a common core20 can be identified. 
Another example: suppose a fleeting phenomenon led to conflicting 
reports: Peter reported seeing a plane, Paul a spaceship, and Mary an air-
balloon. It is absurd to suggest that we should reject all their statements 
and think that nothing has happened. It is possible that one of them may 
be correct. At the very least we should accept the common content of their 
experiences. Unidentified flying object (UFO), vague though it is, is not a 
completely uninformative term. Moreover, if the SR is adopted, history 
would also be imperiled. It is well known that historical documents are 
liable to massive contradictions. However, we don't deduce from this that 
historical enquiry is utterly pointless and can tell us absolutely nothing. 
The job of the historian is to utilize all these materials to reconstruct the 
past by harmonizing them without producing too much strain in the over-
all interpretation. Consider the conflicting descriptions of a historical per-
sonality. These can sometimes be reconciled by the idea of perspective. A 
personality can be multi-faceted and manifest itself in different ways to dif-
ferent people. However, each person will usually accord an unduly high 
degree of ultimacy and immediacy to his encounter with that historical 
personality. Removing this aura of ultimacy, each person's experience of 
that historical personality can be seen to be true from his perspective. It is 
also a commonplace that many historical accounts of a momentous histori-
cal event, e.g., China's Cultural Revolution, are contradictory. It is difficult 
to determine the exact course or nature of this event but it would be pre-
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posterous to deny that the Cultural Revolution has happened. All the 
above examples count against the sceptical policy and show that conflict of 
presumptive data is not irremediable. 
Many critics argue that religious experiences are so contradictory that as 
a whole they must be unreliable. The apparent plausibility of this argu-
ment hinges on the ambiguity of the word "reliability." This can be used in 
a comparative sense. It is true that when a kind of experience yields more 
contradictory beliefs than those yielded by another, the former is less reli-
able than the latter. Hence the conflicts between religious experiences do 
show that they are more unreliable than, say, sensory experiences, but it 
does not follow that they are absolutely unreliable, in the sense that "no 
information can be gained from them at all." It is not true that whenever 
the token experiences conflict, the whole kind is suspect and hence "unreli-
able" in this sense. Even sensory experiences can't pass this test. 
In this light we can evaluate Richard Gale's objection: he argues that 
religious diversities would render the PCT, which he calls "presumptive 
inference rule," inapplicable to religious experiences. He points out that 
there is "no analogous diversity of doxastic practices for basing claims 
about physical objects on sense experience that differ among themselves as 
to what counts as confirmatory and disconfirmatory of a given sense expe-
rience being veridical." He claims that "This is a cognitively invidious dis-
analogy that should destroy the requirement to extend the presumptive 
inference rule from the sense experience to the religious experience doxas-
tic practice in the name of the principle of parity. There should be parity in 
their treatment only if they are sufficiently analogous."21 It should be clear 
that the objection is invalid because the dis analogy of religious experience 
with sense experience in this respect only shows that the former is much 
less reliable than sense experience. It would not show the absolute unrelia-
bility of religious experience unless sense experience is adopted as the par-
adigm. To do the latter is epistemic chauvinism.22 
Hick's claim that the particularist interpretation of the conflicting reli-
gious experiences is a reversal of Alston's principle that "religious experi-
ence constitutes as legitimate a ground for belief-formation as does sense 
experience" is similarly ambiguous. If it means that the conflicts show that 
it is legitimate to apply the PCT to sense experience but not to religious 
experience, then, as I have argued, it suffers from the confusion between the 
PIR and the PCT. If it means that the conflicts between religious experiences 
show that sense experience is a more reliable ground for belief-formation 
than religious experience, then Hick is making a true claim which is not a 
reversal of Alston's principle or the CT A. Either way, Hick's objection fails. 
The distinction between comparative reliability and absolute unreliabili-
ty can be further shown by the following thought experiment. Suppose an 
alien species possessed a kind of perception which was 99.99% reliable. 
One day they landed on the earth and started to investigate the intellectual 
powers of human beings. Although they found that our sense experiences 
were in fact 70% reliable, the conclusion of their report read, "Human 
beings are very inferior in their cognitive power because their sense experi-
ences are very unreliable." Is aliens' judgment justified? Yes, in a compara-
tive sense; but no, in an absolute sense. 
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To sum up, we need to distinguish several senses of reliability or unreli-
ability: 
1) Comparative reliability between different types of experience 
2) Type-reliability 
3) Type-unreliability: 
Absolute type-unreliability: the type of experience is sheer delu-
sion and reveals nothing whatever about the reality. 
Lower-level reliability: although the type is unreliable at the high-
est level of description, it is reliable at a lower level of 
description (d. the Parable of the Survivors). In this case, 
the type is a loose type. 
Sub-type reliability: it is also possible that a sub-type of the type-
unreliable experience can be reliable. This can be illustrated 
by the case of sense experience. 
When we look at the deliverances of sense experience, we find state-
ments about location, shape, size, color, smell, taste and (felt) temperat.ure 
of physical objects. According to the PCT, all of these are prima facie justi-
fied. For common sense, a physical object (objectively) possesses properties 
of size, shape and location as well as of color and smell. However, the lat-
ter comes into conflict with the scientific view of a physical object which, 
according to that view, solely consists of colorless and odourless particles.23 
It becomes difficult to see how these physical objects can objectively pos-
sess color and smell. One solution is to make the distinction between pri-
mary qualities, e.g., shape and size, and secondary qualities, e.g., color and 
smell. The former are really qualities of the physical objects while the latter 
only appear to be so. In other words, this move involves a demarcation of 
sense experience into two sub-types: experiences of the primary qualities 
and experiences of the secondary qualities. The former are still literally 
prima facie reliable while the latter are interpreted as (partly) projections of 
the mind. Experiences of secondary qualities are not cognitively irrelevant 
but they are no longer taken at face value. Actually the two sub-types of 
sense experience do not literally contradict one another. 
Phenomenologically speaking, we can't distinguish one type from the 
other: experience of the whiteness of the paper and experience of its rectan-
gular shape seem equally real and the two are integrated into a single 
experience of the sheet of paper. However, the best explanation of one type 
leads to an understanding of the physical object which contradicts another. 
The conflict can be resolved in various ways. Some deny the conflict is 
real by offering alternative interpretations of common sense statements 
about physical objects. Others take an instrumentalist view of science. That 
these views are to some extent attractive shows that the prima facie eviden-
tial force of the experiences of the secondary qualities is quite strong. It 
seems very obvious that the paper in front of me is really white, for exam-
ple. Nevertheless, if one thinks that the realist view of science and common 
sense is more plausible and the proffered ways of reconciliation are not 
convincing, then one has to re-interpret the experiences of color, etc. In my 
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terms, the prima facie evidential force of these experiences is indirectly 
defeated by the best explanation of our experiences of primary qualities. If 
the above account is correct, sense experiences are also indirectly inconsis-
tent. (Martin, while insisting that many religious experiences are indirectly 
inconsistent, does not seem to realize that this could also be true of sense 
experience.) The common sense interpretation of experiences of secondary 
qualities is not strictly consistent with the scientific interpretation of them. 
The above resolution in favor of the scientific interpretation seems to reflect 
the following principle, The Principle of Conservation: 
In resolving conflicts between experiences, try to adopt the best and 
simplest explanatory hypothesis which preserves the maximum 
prima facie evidential force of the (indirectly) conflicting experiences. 
It should be noted that the above conflict does not result in a whole scale 
scepticism of sense experience nor rejection of science. Neither are the 
experiences of the secondary qualities wholly consigned to the realm of 
illusions nor completely eliminated. Those experiences are still real and 
they reflect something real, i.e., dispositional properties of physical objects. 
Again, it shows that conflicts of experience do not necessarily result in 
whole scale rejection. Why isn't this also true of religious experiences? 
Even if my account is not actually true of our sense experience, it can still 
illustrate a rational strategy to deal with conflicting presumptive data. 
My conclusion is that the CTA's rules for sifting data are indeed rational 
strategies which are employed by us in daily life and by scholars in various 
disciplines. The need for such strategies is undergirded by the recognition 
that our cognitive input is fallible yet not totally unreliable. Knowledge is 
not an all-or-nothing matter. It is also untrue that either we have to accept 
an experience in its totality or reject it in toto. Generally speaking, the CTA 
seems to be a more realistic approach than the atheists' Sceptical Rule. 
Moreover, when we apply the former to conflicting experiences, various 
kinds of realism rather than whole scale skepticism may often be the out-
come. Let us apply this approach to conflicting religious experiences. 
Religious Experience as a Loose Type 
Armed with the above distinctions and principles, we can come back to 
Martin's conflicting claims objection to religious experience: "Swinburne 
advises us when considering a new sense to assume first that by and large 
things are what they seem .... this initial assumption must be quickly aban-
doned in the case of religious experiences. Religious experiences are often 
conflicting, and thus things cannot be what they seem. We must distinguish 
what is veridical and what is not, and there is at present no non-quest ion-
begging theory that enables us to do thiS."24 Suppose he is correct about the 
degree of conflict. Does it follow that religious experiences as a whole have 
no evidential force at all? If my arguments are correct, this conclusion is 
unwarranted. The conflicts of religious experience may indeed show the 
type-unreliability of religious experience at the highest level of description. 
However, I will argue that religious experience is nevertheless a loose type 
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because a common core can be extracted from the diverse religious experi-
ences at a lower level of description. 
Let's elaborate the Parable of the Survivors. Consider their "percep-
tions" of the sun. When they look at the sun, they see some object up there 
but one sees it as round, another as square, and so on. Even worse, for an 
individual he sees it as square on Monday but round on Tuesday and 
hexagonal on Wednesday and so on. Obviously an object can't be both 
round and square at the same time. So the object cannot be identical to 
what it seems most of the time. Clearly the PIR can't be applied here. 
However the application of the PCT is another matter. If they accept this 
and apply it to their conflicting perceptions of the sun, they would at least 
arrive at the conclusion that there is a bright object of some shape up there. 
There is no need to adopt a reductionist account of the 'sun' as nothing but 
projections of their minds, i.e., to discount their experiences of the sun as 
absolutely unreliable. Similarly, despite the conflicts, religious experiences 
still point to the fact that there is another realm up there or beyond. In other 
words, although religious experiences taken as a whole hardly point to a 
determinate supernatural reality, they cohere in that they all point to some-
thing beyond the naturalistic world, i.e., the Transcendent realm. It could be 
fortuitous, of course. However, the collective weight of them should not be 
dismissed cavalierly. It could be defeated but not without good reasons. 
The most important contradiction remains that concerning the nature of 
the ultimate reality. Is it personal or impersonal? Numinous experiences and 
theistic experiences seem to indicate that it is personal while some mystical 
experiences (e.g., the monistic type) seem to show it is impersonal. 
However, even this contradiction is not irremediable.25 Suppose the ulti-
mate reality is indeed personal. It is possible that a personal being can 
manifest himself in a non-personal way. The manifestation can still be 
veridical and revelatory. Consider Yahweh's epiphany to Elijah. God can 
be said to be manifested in the earthquake and the whirlwind but this is 
not yet a personal manifestation. If the epiphany stops at this level, the 
experient may even think that God is impersonal. However, the situation is 
transformed when the "still small voice" is added to the scene. The whole 
experience becomes an unambiguous personal manifestation. So a non-
personal manifestation does not entail that the underlying reality is anti-
personal. This is even more plausible when we realize that orthodox theists 
always maintain that God is more than personal, i.e., the human category 
of "personal" can't exhaust the nature of God. Of course, it can also be 
maintained that an Impersonal Absolute can manifest itself in personal 
ways. For example, some schools of Hinduism make the distinction 
between the saguna-Brahman (the personal manifestation of Brahman) and 
the nirguna-Brahman (the Impersonal Absolute and Ultimate). The present 
point is that it is by no means impossible to organize the diverse religious 
experiences into a coherent framework. Of course some revisionist moves 
are inevitable but the CTA does not forbid them, provided the resulting 
worldview is more coherent.>6 
For example, Caroline Davis carefully sifts through the data and sug-
gests the following as the common core: 
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II (i) the mundane world of physical bodies, physical processes, and 
narrow centres of consciousness is not the whole or ultimate reality. 
(ii) ... there is a far deeper 'true self' which in some way depends on 
and participates in the ultimate reality. 
(iii) Whatever is the ultimate reality is holy, eternal, and of supreme 
value; it can appear to be more truly real than all else, since every-
thing else depends on it. 
(iv) This holy power can be experienced as an awesome, loving, par-
doning, guiding (etc.) presence with whom individuals can have a 
personal relationship ... 
(v) ... at least some mystical experiences are experiences of a very 
intimate union with the holy power ... 
(vi) Some kind of union or harmonious relation with the ultimate 
reality is the human being's summum bonum, his final liberation or 
salvation, and the means by which he discovers his 'true self' or 'true 
home."'27 
Of course, this analysis is controversial and has to be backed up by 
detailed arguments. Nevertheless it can plausibly be maintained that we 
can extract a common core from the diverse religious experiences which 
points to the fact that this spatio-temporal world is not the Ultimate. There 
is more to what we can see. Religious experience as a loose type at least 
supports this modest conclusion. Martin's claim that the conflicts between 
religious experiences automatically render them completely useless as evi-
dence for a religious worldview seems mistaken. While religious experi-
ences themselves may not support a very determinate religious world-
view, they at least tip the balance away from naturalism to some degree, if 
the PCT is accepted. 
Critical Trust: Religious Particularism versus Religious Pluralism 
What has been said above is also acceptable to a pluralist. Hick may argue 
that mere logical compatibility between particularism and the CT A 
amounts to very little, and that his pluralist hypothesis exactly expresses 
the common core of the diverse religious experiences. So his approach is 
still superior to particularism, given the CT A. I investigate this possible 
claim below. Note that I am not offering a comprehensive critique of Hick's 
position. Here I am concerned mainly with whether his pluralism is more 
coherent with the CT A than particularism. Since there are different kinds 
of religious particularism and the answer to the above question may vary 
with the kind of particularism chosen for consideration, I mainly consider 
the theistic interpretation of religious experiences below. 
It is important to emphasize that a religious particularist need not reject 
all religious experiences in other religions. Only those which are truly 
incompatible with her faith need to be rejected. Now a theistic faith is of 
course largely compatible with the bulk of experiences of a personal God. 
Moreover, a theist need not reject all kinds of mystical experience. Theistic 
religions have their own mystics, who believe that their mystical experi-
ences, e.g., union with God, rapture, are not only compatible with but also 
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integral to their theistic faith. The major type of religious experience which 
is clearly incompatible with theism, is monistic mysticism, e.g., the intu-
itive apprehension that Atman is Brahman and that All is One. This kind of 
experience, if veridical at the highest level of description, is incompatible with 
theism because the Ultimate disclosed in this kind of experience is not per-
sonal. However, as suggested above, theists need not completely consign 
all monistic mystical experiences to the rubbish bin. They can provide 
interpretations of monistic experiences which preserve their validity to dif-
ferent degrees. 
Theists can maintain that some monistic experiences are the manifestation 
of the personal God in a non-personal way. It is not at all surprising that God 
will bring about these experiences, which enable us to see the emptiness of 
creaturely things and our inadequacies and liberate us from the attachment 
to things. Having these experiences can be the first stage in the quest for 
God. In interpreting these strictly as experiences of the impersonal Absolute, 
it is possible that either the mystics have misinterpreted their experiences or 
others have been misled by the mystics' language, perhaps under the influ-
ence of monistic traditions. Sometimes a monistic experience may just be an 
experience of the substance of one's soul which is indeed grounded in God. 
Maritain suggests, "The Hindu experience does appear therefore, to be a 
mystical experience in the natural order, a fruitive experience of the absolute, 
of that absolute which is the substantial esse of the soul and, in it and through 
it, of the divine absolute. And how could this experience, being purely nega-
tive, distinguish the one of these absolutes from the other? Inasmuch as it is 
a purely negative experience, it neither confuses nor distinguishes them. 
And since no content of the "essential" order, no quid, is then attained, it is 
comprehensible that philosophic thought reflecting upon such an experience 
inevitably runs the danger of identifying in some measure the one and the 
other absolute, that absolute which is the mirror and that one which is per-
ceived in the mirror. The same word "atman" will designate the human Self 
and the supreme Self."2B 
Now in comparison with the above type of particularism, is Hick's plu-
ralism superior from the perspective of the CTA? I think not. Despite the 
lip service of the pluralist to the PCT, his hypotheSis in fact does violence to 
all kinds of religious experience: they are all "true" of the Real, but only in 
a mythological sense. Hick explains, "I mean by a myth a story that is not 
literally true but that has the power to evoke in its hearers a practical 
response to the myth's referent- a true myth being of course one that 
evokes an appropriate response. The truthfulness of a myth is thus a practi-
cal truthfulness, consisting in its capacity to orient us rightly in our lives. In 
so far as the heavenly Parent is an authentic manifestation of the Real, to 
think of the Real as an ideal parent is to think in a way that can orient us 
rightly to the Real."29 This is because the Real is ineffable and incomprehen-
sible. The Real "is postulated as that which there must be if religious expe-
rience, in its diversity of forms, is not purely imaginative projection but is 
also a response to a transcendent reality."30 Referring to attributes like per-
sonality, love, goodness, compassion, justice, mercy, intentions, conscious-
ness, knowledge, etc., Hick says that "all these attributes are components 
of our human conceptual repertoire ... an ultimate reality ... exceeds that 
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conceptual repertoire ... It has its own nature, presumably infinite in rich-
ness, but that nature is not thinkable in human terms.//)1 
This position has the drastic consequence that no religious experience is 
ever literally true of the Real, and no major type of religious experience 
captures even to some degree the nature of the Real. Despite all the talk 
that both theistic experiences and monistic experiences are authentic mani-
festation of the Real, from a cognitive and not practical standpoint, Hick is 
denying in toto the content of all these experiences.32 Hick says, "in denying 
that the Real is personal one is not saying that it is impersonal, but rather 
that the personal-impersonal dualism does not apply here.//33 This is to 
admit that Hick's pluralism preserves the cognitive validity of neither the 
theistic type nor the non-theistic type of religious experience in which the 
Real appears to be personal and impersonal respectively. In contrast, the 
above theistic interpretation successfully saves a significant portion of the 
phenomena, e.g., theistic experiences, and preserves to different extent the 
validity of other types of religious experience, e.g., monistic experiences. 
(Theists can agree that the nature of the Real is infinite in richness but this 
does not entail the ineffability of the Real. This infinite richness only entails 
that human terms can never fully capture or comprehend the nature of the 
Real.) This is consonant with the Principle of Conservation of the CTA. If 
Alston's position were the reversal of the PCT, then Hick's pluralism 
would be an even greater reversal! Of course, as I have argued, both partic-
ularism and pluralism are formally compatible with the PCT but the for-
mer seems to conform better to the CTA than Hick's pluralism.34 
Furthermore, the theistic interpretation preserves better the moral 
nature of the Real. Hick takes pains to demonstrate that the concern for the 
good is common to different religious traditions. For example, he seems to 
believe that extreme cruelty is incompatible with the nature of the Real, as 
implied by his condemnation of the Christian Church's misdeeds in histo-
ry. However, under the constraint of his doctrine of ineffability, he has to 
say this: "I do not describe the Real in itself as good, or benign, or gracious. 
But in relation to us- that is, in terms of the difference that it makes to us- it 
is good as the ground of the transformed state which is our highest good. 
So the sense in which the Real is good, benign, gracious is analogous to 
that in which the sun is, from our point of view, good, friendly, life-giv-
ing ... Likewise, the Real is the necessary condition of our existence and our 
highest good. It is in this sense that we can speak of the Real as being, in 
relation to us, good, benign, gracious. But when we describe the Real in 
itself in these terms we are speaking mythologically rather than literally.//35 
This consequence is rather depressing. In contrast, theism can speak of 
the Real as literally or at least analogously gracious and good.'" This is a 
merit from the perspective of the CT A because that the Real is good and 
gracious is the common content of many diverse religious experiences, and 
is endorsed by the major traditions. Given Hick's emphasis on the moral 
criterion, it is indeed strange that moral categories cannot even apply to the 
Real. On Hick's terms, can we say that extreme cruelty is really incompati-
ble with the nature of the Real? No, we can only say that the Real is not the 
ground of cruelty, and so on. Is this kind of roundabout statement about 
the causal relationship between cruelty and the Real really expressing the 
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essence of our intuition, which Hick seems to share, that extreme cruelty is 
an absolute evil? It is clear that all these questions do not plague theism 
which can forthrightly says that extreme cruelty is logically incompatible 
with the holy nature of God. There is no need for theists to posit the tortu-
ous noumenal-phenomenal distinction here. 
Hick has likened the Real to the sun above. Let us come back to the sur-
vivors' conflicting perceptions of the sun in my parable. Now suppose 
there are three major schools about the shape of the sun: Round Sun 
School, Square Sun School, and Hexagonal Sun School. Further suppose 
all three schools are equally supported by the survivors' experience, and all 
of them cannot prove on neutral grounds the superiority of their positions. 
In this impasse there comes a Pluralist, who argues that each of the three 
positions is arbitrary and unjustified. He argues that the only solution is to 
postulate a Noumenal Sun which is invisible and shapeless. (To be more 
accurate, we should say the whole category of spatial or visual attributes is 
inapplicable to the Noumenal Sun.) All the experiences of the Round Sun, 
Square Sun and Hexagonal Sun are unveridical, literally speaking. 
Nevertheless, the Round Sun, Square Sun and Hexagonal Sun are authentic 
manifestations of the Noumenal Sun because they can all orient people 
appropriately to the Noumenal Sun. The Pluralist claims that his hypothe-
sis is the best and most comprehensive explanation because it has taken 
account of all their experiences.37 In contrast, each of the three schools has 
only taken account of one-third of the experiences, hence is inferior. How 
should we think of this Pluralist? Isn't it quite clear that the postulation of a 
Noumenal Sun here is rather farfetched and unnecessary? Moreover, his 
claim to comprehensiveness is bogus because the Pluralist's "taking 
account of an experience" amounts only to "granting that experience a 
merely phenomenal status." After he has "taken account of all the experi-
ences," all experiences, at least one-third of which have been deemed reli-
able before, are now completely divorced from the Real Sun, from the cogni-
tive viewpoint. I can imagine all three Schools protesting in one voice that 
the Pluralist is in fact contemptuous of all their experiences. Anyway, it is 
by no means clear that the Pluralist's position is superior to either School. 
The implications for religious pluralism should be clear. 
To fully establish the superiority of the theistic interpretation of reli-
gious experiences, a lot more needs to be said. However, the purpose here 
is more modest. I just want to outline a reply to Hick's charge that from the 
perspective of the CT A, particularism is inferior to pluralism. The above 
discussions suggest that theism has more strategies to handle diverse reli-
gious experiences than Hick tends to believe, and those strategies are con-
sonant with the CT A. Moreover, Hick's doctrine of the ineffability of the 
Real seriously endangers the cognitive validity of aU religious experiences, 
which is exactly what the PCT is supposed to protect as far as possible. The 
tables are turned against Hick. Before he can satisfactorily deal with all the 
issues, it is premature for him to declare victory. 
Conclusion 
The CTA advises us to trust all religious experiences. A religious particular-
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ist believes that only one world religion is basically correct. So on the sur-
face it seems that a religious particularist cannot adopt the CT A. This is a 
misunderstanding. On the one hand, the trust advocated is only a prima Jacie 
trust. The CTA in itself does not favour any particular position on religious 
diversity because it only asserts the prima facie evidential force of religious 
experiences. We must bear in mind the critical elements of the CT A. If suffi-
cient reasons are given for doubting religious experiences, the CTA can 
happily co-exist with atheism. On the other hand, while a religious particu-
larist will not accept many religious experiences of other religions at the 
highest level oj description, he does not need to deny that those experiences 
may contain elements of truth at a lower level of description. If he adopts 
the CT A, then he would think that in face of conflicting prima facie justified 
beliefs or experiences, it is rational to salvage something from them. 
1 have argued that this strategy is actually feasible in many other cases, 
and may also be feasible in the case of religious diversity. The presence of 
conflicts between religious experiences is not in itself a sufficient reason for 
adopting the atheist option. To do so would be analogous to rejecting all 
eye-witnesses' reports just because they conflict with one another. It may 
be possible to identify a "common core" of diverse religious experiences. 
While this does not settle the debates between religions, it may tip the bal-
ance towards a religious world view. 1 have also indicated that type-umeli-
ability can be combined with sub-type-reliability. So, for example,theistic 
experience can be separated from non-theistic experiences and then its sub-
type-reliability investigated separately. (A similar strategy, of course, is 
open to believers of other religions.) Surely the problem of conflicts 
between theistic experience and theism-incompatible religious experiences 
remains. The theist need not insist that the conflict can be resolved entirely 
on neutral grounds; he need only show that he is not irrational in trusting 
his theistic experiences. How this position is to be worked out must be left 
for another time. The burden of this paper is that this position is compati-
ble with the CTA, and is arguably superior to the atheist or pluralist solu-
tions from the perspective of the CTA. (1 leave open the possibility that 
Hick's hypothesis might be correct.) So it seems misguided to deny that 
religious exclusivism can be combined with the CT A. 
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